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ACCOUNTING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 
Malori M. McGill* 
Abstract: A meaningful percentage of the regulation that companies in the United States 
must follow concerns two distinct topics: accounting and the environment. The values 
underlying the regulatory framework of securities and the environment are distinct, but they 
are not wholly opposite. This Comment responds to growing trends of private governance in 
the area of environmental regulation. Besides federal regulation, a significant portion of 
environmental regulation touching U.S. companies today remains sourced from and enforced 
by private standard-setters. Federal accounting regulations are now governed by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB)––a private entity recognized by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC)––but almost all federal accounting regulations once found their 
authority solely in private sources. Mirroring accounting regulation’s history, the federal 
government may choose to outsource environmental standard-setting to one or more of these 
already-operating private standard-setters in exchange for their expertise, resources, 
and  recognition. 
Drawing on parallels from the regulatory history of the accounting industry, this Comment 
cautions that the purposes of environmental regulation demand a more democratic process. 
Beginning with an overview of government-created and -outsourced corporations, and turning 
to a dissection of FASB’s structure under the federal government, this Comment concludes 
that private environmental standard-setters will face potential legal issues if the government 
adopts them in a manner similar to FASB’s delegation as the authoritative standard setter. The 
broad implications of environmental standards and regulations––and the prominent and diverse 
social values driving them––demand a process more deeply rooted in democracy before they 
become authoritative law at federal levels. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite broad federal regulation of the environment, scholars suggest 
that environmental preferences—historically exposed, recognized, and 
enforced through political processes—are increasingly expressed and 
derived from “private interactions in social settings and the marketplace.”1 
So-called “private environmental governance” is on the rise,2 meaning 
environmental objectives and preferences are being addressed through 
private contract. For example, companies are now commonly subjecting 
                                                   
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2020. I would like to thank 
Professor Sanne Knudsen for her incredibly thoughtful guidance and comments, as well as Professors 
Ryan Calo and Jennifer Fan for offering their expertise. I would also like to thank Professor Kathryn 
Watts for sparking my initial interest in the constitutional and administrative law topics discussed in 
this piece. Finally, thank you to the editors at Washington Law Review for the valuable time and 
efforts they offered in helping me publish.  
1. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 133 (2013). 
2. See, e.g., id. at 135 (noting that U.S. corporations spend more “on private environmental 
investigations” than the annual enforcement budget of the EPA). 
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themselves to environmental standards, not because of government 
regulation or tax purposes, but because of the preferences of their 
customers and shareholders.3 Some examples of these private 
environmental standard-setters include: Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC), the Marine Stewardship Council, Equator Principles, the U.S. 
Green Building Council (USBG), Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED), and the Clean Development Mechanism 
Gold Standard.4 
The presence and rise of these private environmental regulators can be 
attributed in some part to a lack of governmental action in regulating the 
environment paired with the broad reach of environmental priorities: 
Government may not be able to act because [some] problem[s] 
occur[] outside of any national boundary (e.g., open oceans) or 
occur[] inside the boundary of another nation. National 
governments have little ability to regulate environmental 
behavior in other countries, and the international trade regime 
makes it difficult to impose requirements on goods[.]5 
Other reasons for private governance may be that it costs less—both 
financially and in what it requires of both resources and collective 
action—than other types of governance.6 
This trend towards private standard-setting in environmental 
regulations suggests it is time to think more methodically about the 
wisdom of the trend. This Comment suggests that the history of the 
creation of accounting regulations can shed some valuable light. To that 
end, this trend in the environmental world is not wholly unlike the long-
lost history of accounting standards. Throughout the history of accounting 
regulation, the use of private entities to address industry-wide change and 
standard-setting has been commonplace. Accounting regulation in the 
United States was largely privatized from inception.7 Over time, however, 
the federal government began outsourcing to private entities for public, 
and legally authoritative, accounting standards. Now, although the SEC 
holds the authority to set financial regulations for U.S. companies, it adopts 
                                                   
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 148–56. 
5. Id. at 169 (“Private governance could fill gaps where public governance cannot reach because of 
political, territorial, or expertise gaps. It also could undermine, enhance, delay, accelerate, or complement 
government action in situations where government can act.”). But see Jyoti Madhusoodanan, What Do 
Sustainability Labels Really Mean?, THE WEEK (Sep. 21, 2019), https://theweek.com/articles/861742/what-
sustainability-labels-really-mean [https://perma.cc/P6RG-UNRZ].  
6. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 133 (noting that “[p]rivate market behavior may be less costly to 
individuals than political behavior and may require little or no collective action”).  
7. Omar Ochoa, Accounting for FASB: Why Administrative Law Should Apply to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 489, 498 (2011). 
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accounting standards (i.e. U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP)) as they are created by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), a private entity.8 
Because the area of setting accounting standards has a rich history of 
balancing government regulation with private governance, it is prudent to 
consider whether this history is pertinent to the upward trend in private 
governance in environmental regulation. And so, while the genesis of 
these seemingly disconnected standards are seldom compared––in legal 
scholarship or elsewhere––the history of the creation of accounting 
regulations sheds a light on the recent increase in private governance in 
environmental regulation. This Comment explores the paralleled 
developments of these two spaces and makes two primary observations: 
(1) there are both similarities and differences in the values and expertise 
that shape accounting and environmental policies; and (2) because of the 
differences, the anti-democratic concerns that surround private standard-
setting in accounting may be even more problematic for environmental 
regulations. 
In order to exchange its stock on any U.S. public stock exchange, a 
company must periodically present its financial statements to the public 
according to GAAP—accounting standards as dictated by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC).9 GAAP includes over 2,000 standards 
for companies to follow,10 relating to everything from physical assets, to 
receipts of sale, to executive employee compensation. U.S. public 
companies adhere to GAAP to avoid severe liability.11 
In recent years, scholars have noted that despite murky, slow, and 
controversial waters within the federal government, private governance 
regarding environmental standards is steadily rising.12 Instead of being 
                                                   
8. SEC Release No. 34-47743 (2003), No. 33-8221 (2003).  
9. See, e.g., Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01 (2019) (requiring financial statements of issuers 
to be “prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting” principles or otherwise be 
presumably misleading or inaccurate); AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AT A GLANCE: 
GUIDE TO THE AICPA FOR STATE BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY  EXECUTIVE  DIRECTORS  38–
58 (2014), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/state/documents/stateboardhandbook-
final.pdf [https://perma.cc/27Y9-8SNB] (defining common terms used in the public accounting practice).  
10. Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of Accounting and Auditing 
Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 65, 85 (2005). 
11. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html [https://perma.cc/2ZMN-H2N3] [hereinafter What We 
Do, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION] (“Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness . . . is its 
enforcement authority. Each year the SEC brings hundreds of civil enforcement actions against 
individuals and companies for violation of the securities laws. Typical infractions include insider 
trading, accounting fraud, and providing false or misleading information about securities and the 
companies that issue them.”). 
12. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 133. Private standard-setters are not only becoming more 
prominent in the environmental regulation field. For example, the regulation of commercial privacy 
standards is often assessed through private auditing and consulting companies. See generally Daniel 
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subjected to more public regulation, U.S. public companies are, more 
often than ever, voluntarily signing up for more private regulation to 
address their consumers’ demands for greater attention to environmental 
concerns.13 As opposed to using the democratic process, the public is 
voicing their concerns for the environment through private channels. As a 
result, private entities are responding to public concerns directly––
bypassing traditional democratic processes––and setting standards to 
address environmental issues ranging from building classifications to 
water quality to forest management practices; and the adoption of these 
standards is becoming widespread.14 
A common trend for the federal government historically has been to 
outsource governmental functions to such private standard-setters. This 
type of outsourcing or adopting from private entities comes with certain 
benefits. When the federal government outsources to private entities who 
in turn follow traditional government channels to create regulation, the 
resulting structure embodies administrative and constitutional law 
principles. For example, better and more closely-linked input from 
experts, potential cost cutting, and uniform standards across an industry 
are prioritized.15 Many of these benefits are aims of administrative law in 
general. In the case of accounting standards, drawing upon experts in 
private standard-setting entities has long helped the SEC promote its 
overall purpose––to protect investors, the financial markets, and the 
formation of capital.16 Because science is generally a strong driver in 
environmental policy, closely-linked input from experts is also a positive 
factor for creating environmental regulation. Finally, following traditional 
governmental channels to regulate promotes constitutional principles, 
such as the non-delegation doctrine, to ensure that the public’s lawmaking 
concerns are properly directed through elected officials. 
                                                   
J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 
583, 618 (2014) (summarizing the required “[a]ssessments by [i]ndependent [p]rofessionals” in FTC 
consent orders); Verne Kopytoff, Privacy Audits Required of Internet Firms, SF GATE (Mar. 10, 
2013),  https://www.sfgate.com/technology/article/Privacy-audits-required-of-Internet-firms-
4343921.php%3b [https://perma.cc/UL9T-PNTJ]. 
13. Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 133. See also ERIC F. LAMBIN & TANNIS THORLAKSON, 
SUSTAINABILITY STANDARDS: INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE ACTORS, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND 
GOVERNMENTS, ANNUAL REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES 369, 379–80 (2018), 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-102017-025931 [https://perma.cc/ATE2-6L86] 
(“[G]overnments rely on a private governance initiative to implement their public regulations” and in 
some cases private standards are “a precursor to mandatory regulations, preparing the ground for more 
stringent public policies.”). 
14. See, e.g., Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 148–56. 
15. Stephen M. Maurer, Public Problems, Private Answers: Reforming Industry Self-Governance Law for 
the 21st Century, 12 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 297, 336 (2014); Sarah B. Schindler, Following Industry’s 
LEED: Municipal Adoption of Private Green Building Standards, 62 FLA. L. REV. 285, 315, 328 (2010). 
16. See infra note 57.  
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However, these benefits to outsourcing to private standard-setters are 
met with several costs––costs which could be most detrimental to a 
regulatory scheme for the environment. These costs include less certainty 
in the public’s ability to provide input into the public entity’s decision-
making process and a decreased ability for the public’s values to be 
recognized through a democratic process. Relatedly, private standard-
setters often have a lesser degree of accountability between their decision-
makers—who are usually not federally appointed or elected—and 
members of the public.17 One scholar has noted in the context of 
accounting regulation: “private standard setters . . . [don’t] bear a legal 
duty or responsibility to establish rules that are socially beneficial.”18 As 
a result, the public can often be confused, and companies may have a 
greater ability to act selfishly.19 Private standard setters to whom 
government functions are outsourced, however, are not restricted by 
protections against these costs, such as the Constitution’s Appointments 
Clause and removal doctrine.20 
As in accounting regulation, socially beneficial regulations in the 
environmental field are increasingly important. As private governance in 
the area of environmental regulation increases, the question of whether 
and when governmental entities will begin adopting private regulations as 
their own becomes increasingly relevant.21 Over time, the government 
may consider outsourcing––as the SEC did with FASB––to already-
operating private standard-setters to create its regulations. One scholar has 
already reported some municipal-level adoption of private building 
quality standards.22 Though unexpected corollaries, this anticipated trend 
within the environmental regulatory sector bears strong resemblance to 
the history of U.S. accounting regulation.23 
                                                   
17. See, e.g., Maurer, supra note 15, at 330.  
18. Arthur Acevedo, The Fox and the Ostrich: Is GAAP a Game of Winks and Nods?, 12 
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 63, 105 (2010). 
19. Id. at 65 (highlighting “the SEC’s failure to create and actively regulate accounting standards,” and 
opining that this failure has caused “public confusion and allow[s] companies to manipulate financial results”).  
20. See, e.g., Susan L. Martin, The Appointments Clause and the SEC’s Administrative Law Judges: 
Protecting the Separation of Powers, Political Accountability, and Investors, 12 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 
287, 291 (2018) (noting the Appointments Clause represents a “careful separation and balancing of 
power” and serves to “allow citizens to know who is responsible for appointments, so they can react 
politically if they either approve or disapprove of those appointments”).  
21. For discussion of countries and areas in which government adoption of private standards is 
already occurring, see LAMBIN & THORLAKSON, supra note 13, at 379–80 (2018) (noting as one 
example, the authors discuss that “[t]he US Lacey Act . . . includes a public recognition of private 
certification schemes for timber” and later note that Bolivia’s forest management standards were 
influenced by private FSC standards).  
22. See generally Schindler, supra note 15. 
23. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 498. 
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This Comment cautions that private environmental standard-setters 
will face potential legal issues, and a decrease in democratic 
accountability, if the government adopts them in a manner similar to the 
Financial Accounting Standard Board’s (FASB) delegation as the 
authoritative GAAP standard-setter in the 1970s. Despite the substantive 
differences between accounting and environmental regulation, the issues 
are worth discussing together. Beginning with a broad and overarching 
history of U.S. accounting regulation, specifically through the lens of the 
quasi-public entity FASB, this Comment seeks to lay a foundation of the 
relevant considerations for the federal adoption of private environmental 
standards.24 Specifically, this Comment seeks to address what 
environmental regulators should expect if they choose to adopt private 
standards in a similar manner to the SEC’s adoption of FASB’s standards, 
and offers one perspective on the potential road ahead. 
This Comment will proceed as follows: Part I seeks to identify some of 
the differing social values driving regulation in both the accounting and 
environmental fields. Part II includes a background of the history and 
trends of outsourcing functions of the U.S. federal government, as well as 
discussion of the benefits of public recognition of private standard-setters. 
Part III explains the role of FASB and its structure as a private standard-
setter with public governance authority. In Part IV, both the judicial and 
potential constitutional treatments of FASB are considered. Finally, 
Part V concludes by suggesting that if private environmental-standard 
setters are to become publicly authoritative, they should follow a path 
unlike that of FASB. 
I. VALUES IN ACCOUNTING AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL  REGULATION 
At first blush, comparing accounting and environmental regulations is 
admittedly odd. We don’t generally think of the policies for recognizing 
the present value of leases, for example, in the same breath as the policies 
for promoting water-conscious farming practices. However, the values 
informing decisionmaking within the regulatory world of each are not 
wholly beyond compare. This Part outlines the similarities––and 
important distinctions––between the types of values driving standards in 
the accounting and environmental regulatory schemes. Despite 
differences between them, environmental regulation and accounting 
regulation, are similar enough in their embodiment of social values such 
                                                   
24. The federal government’s adoption of private environmental standards could take many forms. 
For example, Congress could give authority to a private entity’s standards through statute or the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), or another agency, could use its rulemaking authority with 
influence from private standards. See generally LAMBIN & THORLAKSON, supra note 13. 
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that both require a democratic process through which people’s values 
can  be represented. 
Stemming from the SEC’s mission to promote the reliability of 
financial information for the U.S. public, the primary purpose of GAAP 
is “to increase investor confidence by ensuring transparency and accuracy 
in financial reporting.”25 As one scholar noted, “[s]hareholders, managers, 
accountants, courts, legislators, and the public rely on GAAP as the 
financial yardstick by which to measure financial performance.”26 Values 
underlying accounting standards include transparency, accuracy, 
accountability, and fairness.27 Accounting standards reflect the public’s 
interest in limiting fraud and otherwise manipulated financial results.28 
They are generally based on the judgments of standard setters29 to ensure 
financial information is “fair[ly] present[ed] in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting practice.”30 And once established, one accounting 
rule versus another can affect “stock prices, investment decisions, and 
executive compensation.”31 Those effects, in turn, can impact the economy 
more broadly. There are, in other words, policy choices embedded in 
something as seemingly mundane as accounting standards. 
In the environmental context, the stakes for ensuring democratically 
acceptable standards are even higher. The values informing decisions and 
standards in environmental regulation are also even broader. Depending 
on one’s perspective and the type of environmental standard, “religious, 
philosophical, morality-based, aesthetic, scientific, and more” can form 
the basis for how environmental standards are developed and enforced.32 
One author notes that environmental policy often reflects both “human-
centered” (i.e. decisions aimed at human benefit) and “nature-centric” (i.e. 
decisions aimed at benefiting the environment or protecting its resources) 
                                                   
25. In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting In re 
Global Crossing Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).  
26. Acevedo, supra note 18, at 92. 
27. Id. at 127 (arguing why “[t]ransparency, disclosure, and confidence building” are diminished 
when the SEC allows private standard setters to enforce its policies).  
28. Id. at 71–72.  
29. William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5, 8 (2007) (“[N]o hard science of financial reporting 
exists to import definitive justification to a given standard . . . The standard setter, no 
matter how well informed, makes a judgment call.”).  
30.  Bruce Bennett, Michael Bradbury & Helen Prangnell, Rules, Principles, and Judgments in 
Accounting Standards, 42 ABACUS, 189, 191 (2006).  
31. Bratton, supra note 29 (providing a wide-range of reasons why FASB has been critiqued).  
32. Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Human-Centered Environmental Values Versus Nature-Centric 
Environmental Values: Is This the Question?, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 273, 277 (2014) 
(naming the potential social values underlying the “policies of environmental protection”).  
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ideals.33 And often, political values undermine any other stakeholder’s 
values in environmental regulation.34 With the plethora of values 
underlying environmental policy, “public discussion of environmental 
values and of values that may conflict with environmental protection” 
should be encouraged.35 
With that fundamental aspect of environmental regulation in mind––
namely that the policy and choice that public, democratic processes offer 
are even more important in the environmental context because varying 
values drive people’s preferences for regulation––the remainder of this 
Comment will use FASB as its primary lens. It will address whether 
private standard-setters are the appropriate mechanism for the future of 
environmental standard-setting. In the course of this exploration of private 
standard-setters, an understanding of accounting regulation is informative 
because of the primary role private standard-setters have played 
throughout U.S. accounting history. Though accounting and 
environmental regulation are distinct––and though they are driven by 
unique policy and social values––the recent development of private 
environmental standard-setters makes these two schemes comparable. 
II. HISTORY OF OUTSOURCING FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENTAL  FUNCTIONS 
Having established the similarities between accounting and 
environmental regulation, it is worth pausing to understand the history of 
standard-setting in accounting, which reflects a broader tradition of 
outsourcing certain governmental functions to private entities. As alluded 
to above, accounting’s history within that broader history of outsourcing 
may inform future decisions regarding private standard-setting in 
environmental regulation. 
As early as the 1910s, the federal government—and interestingly some 
states—began creating and acquiring corporations to act as government 
agents.36 The purpose of government-created corporations was largely to 
                                                   
33. See generally id. The author also notes there is a third realm of influence on environmental 
policy, which is politically centered. Id. at 277–80. 
34. Id. at 277–78, 289 (“[I]n the realms of public health and environmental protection, even 
pragmatic invocation of the human-centric importance of these issues and initiatives does not 
guarantee the attention and support of our current mechanisms of governance. . . The particular form 
of politico-centricity that characterizes current national governance proceeds without consistent 
regard for the actual public merits of the issues before it.”).  
35. Holly Doremus, Shaping the Future: The Dialectic of Law and Environmental Values, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 233, 256 (2003). 
36. See, e.g., Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 388 (1995) (noting that “[t]he 
first large-scale use of Government-controlled corporations came with the First World War” followed 
by “the next major group of Government corporations” during and after the Great Depression 
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fill gaps in the federal government’s responses to certain events, and to do 
so with some level of expertise, bipartisanship, and outsourcing.37 Up until 
the Great Depression and the end of World War II, the government created 
these entities rapidly, and in the views of many, eventually it “had gotten 
out of hand, in both their number and their lack of accountability.”38 In 
response, many World War II-era government-created entities were 
dissolved.39 In the decades to follow, the federal government instead 
relied on more private-like entities “with Government-conferred 
advantages.”40 Today, we are left with a mix of characters in government-
created corporations.41 
The legal treatment of these entities has been mixed, but in most 
instances, at the very least, constitutional limits and protections are said 
to apply to these types of entities.42 For example, in 1995, the Supreme 
Court held that Amtrak—an entity expressly recognized by Congress as 
nongovernmental, but created by statute and controlled by executive-
branch appointees—was not relieved from upholding First Amendment 
restrictions.43 Except for its title as “nongovernmental,” Amtrak was 
fulfilling a governmental purpose––by statute––and therefore subject to 
the same restrictions as any governmental entity.44 The Supreme Court 
remanded the case for the district court to apply First Amendment 
principles to Amtrak’s refusal to display the plaintiff’s advertisement.45 
For the most part, “[c]ourts have been receptive to the inclusion of 
government agencies and government corporations as part of the 
                                                   
“primarily directed to stabilizing the economy and to making distress loans to farm, homeowners, 
banks, and other enterprises”).  
37. See, e.g., id. (discussing the creation of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation during the 
Great Depression to essentially make and funds loans to banks and struggling companies; later the 
RFC would be authorized to create its own entities).  
38. Id. at 389.  
39. Id. at 390. 
40. Id.  
41. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 58 (2012) (“Many also claim that 
the promises of expertise and bipartisanship have not been realized, arguing that these agencies no 
longer attract the very best persons, and the moderate and bipartisan composition of boards has been 
undermined by the increasing appointment of strong partisans or ideologues.”). 
42. See, e.g., Lebron, 513 U.S. at 397 (“That Government-created and -controlled corporations are 
(for many purposes at least) part of the Government itself has a strong basis, not merely in past 
practice and understanding, but in reason itself. It surely cannot be that government, state or federal, 
is able to evade the most solemn obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the 
corporate form.”). 
43. Id. at 392. 
44. Id. at 397–98. 
45. Id. at 399. 
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government,”46 when the corporation is created by law and where the 
government (i.e. Congress) “retains for itself permanent authority to 
appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation.”47 For example, 
most government corporations were (and are) “headed by single 
administrators selected by the President.”48 The Appointments Clause, 
which plays some role in why most government corporations were 
constructed this way, will be discussed in Part III below. At its broadest 
interpretation, this constitutional underlay helps ensure proper oversight 
and accountability of public agencies. As this Comment will show, the 
lack of this and other protections in some forms of governmental entities 
raises potential concern. 
A. The History of Federal Accounting Regulation Includes Elements 
of Outsourcing 
Of a similar strain to the government-created corporations of the 
twentieth century is the federal government’s outsourcing of rulemaking 
bodies and standard setters to private entities.49 Scholars have noted this 
outsourcing to experts as a widespread theme used “[t]o address the 
increasing challenges of legislating that governments face in modern 
societies,”50 and one way in which governments can hand off the struggle to 
balance the competing interests among private entities and individuals.51 
One both economically and politically charged area in which the 
outsourcing of rules and standards has played a role is accounting and 
financial reporting.52 “Throughout most of history, accounting standards 
                                                   
46. Margit Cohn, Tension and Legality: Towards a Theory of the Executive Branch, 29 CAN. J.L. 
& JURIS. 321, 331 (2016) (citing Lebron, 513 U.S. 374 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010) as but two examples of this sort of inclusion). In 
1998, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President Clinton updated and revised its 
OMB Circular A-119 on the “federal use and development of voluntary standards.” OMB, Circular 
No. A- 119, 63 Fed. Reg. 8546 (Feb. 19, 1998). In relevant part it stated, “All federal agencies must 
use voluntary consensus standards in lieu of government-unique standards in their procurement and 
regulatory activities, except where inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical.” Id. at 8554. This 
circularity may have some impact on the courts’ treatment of these entities as well.  
47. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400. 
48. Selin, supra note 41, at 57. 
49. Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule-Making 
in the Public Interest, 18 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. POL’Y, ADMIN., & INSTITUTIONS 399 (2005) 
(“[P]ublic authority and regulatory functions have been delegated to (or effectively been acquired by) 
highly specialized private actors, creating new forms of public-private governance.”).  
50. Andreas M. Fleckner, FASB and IASB: Dependence Despite Independence, 3 VA. L. & BUS. 
REV. 275, 276–77 (2008) (arguing that one “idea of [] democracy is that an individual is vested with 
power because she is elected by the people, not because she is the most knowledgeable”).  
51. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 403.  
52. Id. at 400.   
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[were] a product of self-regulation.”53 With the enactment of the landmark 
legislation in 1933 and 1934—the Securities Exchange Act—however, 
Congress “directed the SEC to determine the form and content of financial 
statements.”54 In doing so, Congress delegated the authority to the SEC—
an independent public agency—to create financial reporting standards.55 
The resulting standards are called GAAP. GAAP tells companies how, 
where, and when to record and disclose financial transactions in their 
financial statements. Then—in theory—”[i]nvestors, lenders, and other 
users of financial information rely on financial reporting based on GAAP 
to make decisions about how and where to provide financing, and to help 
financial markets operate as efficiently as possible.”56 
It is worth noting here that the SEC is the federal agency tasked with 
regulating financial statements because of its general role and purpose in 
the federal government. The SEC’s stated mission “is to protect investors, 
maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital 
formation.”57 In serving this mission, the SEC regulates financial 
statements by recognizing GAAP and by requiring audits of public 
company financial statements.58 
Beginning in 1938, the SEC decided to hand over its authority to create 
financial statement standards to private entities in the accounting 
profession, recognizing the previously private standards as critical 
elements of the government’s control over financial regulation.59 Instead 
of using its rulemaking authority to craft accounting standards, the SEC 
would––and continues to––recognize private standard-setters as 
authoritative and enforce their standards accordingly. 
                                                   
53. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 498. 
54. Id.; Securities Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881.  
55. Id.; see also Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 407. 
56. About GAAP, FIN. ACCT. FOUND., https://www.accountingfoundation.org/jsp 
/Foundation/Page/FAFBridgePage&cid=1176164538898#section_2 [https://perma.cc/87E6-N42Q].  
57. What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 11. 
58. See Bart H. Ward, The Intensification of Federal Oversight of the Accounting Profession, 28 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 211, 214 (2003) (“Since its inception, the SEC has attempted to assist 
investors by working to assure the reliability of the financial information produced by entities that 
issue publicly traded securities. In pursuit of this purpose, the SEC requires independent audits of 
registrants’ financial statements and related matters. This process requires that the registered entity 
produce financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
The financial statements and related disclosures must be accompanied by an independent auditor’s 
opinion about the fairness of the issuer’s financials. This opinion must be issued by a CPA.”); In re 
WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 472, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting In re Global Crossing 
Ltd. Sec. Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (calling the “‘single unified purpose’ of 
GAAP ‘to increase investor confidence by ensuring transparency and accuracy in financial 
reporting’”).   
59. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 408. 
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For decades to follow, the SEC’s recognition of private accounting 
standard-setters would mirror the chaos of a hastily-planned family 
reunion.60 While the players largely stayed the same, the official 
“authority” recognized by the SEC continued to change. The Committee 
on Accounting Procedure (CAP), a rulemaking body within the American 
Institute of Professional Accountants (AICPA), was the first private entity 
chosen by Congress to set financial regulation and accounting standards.61 
It was followed about twenty years later by the Accounting Principles 
Board (APB), another entity under the AICPA, which remained in place 
until 1972.62 But, by 1971, the SEC had become aware of the need for a 
new structure—the accounting industry, its professionals, and those relying 
on financial statements regulated by the SEC demanded more independence 
and “constituent representation” from the accounting standard setter.63 On 
the recommendation of a committee of private individuals and 
professionals, the modern state of accounting standards was born.64 Though 
established as an entirely private entity (i.e. no government funding or role 
in the appointment process), FASB was adopted by the SEC in 1973 as the 
third accounting standard setter for U.S. financial statements.65 The SEC 
was apparently mindful that a structure better aligned with democratic 
ideals was necessary. 
                                                   
60. The SEC’s website states that one of its primary responsibilities is to “oversee private 
regulatory organizations in the securities, accounting, and auditing fields.” What We Do, U.S. 
SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 11. Besides the FASB, the SEC also oversees the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a private, non-profit corporation. Id.  
61. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 408. See also Adam I. Stein et al., Against Convergence: 
Mounting a Legal Challenge to FASB’s Adoption of International Accounting Standards, in 6 
BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS—SECURITIES LAW 2, 2 (2002) (“The Committee on Accounting 
Procedure, . . . was hampered by inadequate research and insufficient credibility.”). 
62. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 408; see also Ochoa, supra note 7, at 499 (noting the demise 
of the APB was “both because of standards promulgated and because of the perception that the APB 
was dominated by large accounting firms.”). See generally Stein et al., supra note 61 (noting the 
committee’s focus on “one-off questions rather than overarching principles and standards” led to 
its  demise).  
63. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 499 (“A conference of auditors, preparers, and financial statement 
users . . . resulted in the creation” of FASB.).  
64. Mattli & Buthe, supra note 49, at 408. 
65. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 498; see also Bratton, supra note 29, at 31–35 (suggesting an entity 
such as FASB was needed because “absent a centralized standard setter producing user-directed and 
mandated GAAP, reporting would suffer from the structural imbalances that otherwise impair the 
corporate governance system,” and noting that FASB’s structure relative to the SEC “works in 
practice because the FASB’s appointment structure and rules of independence assure that its members 
pursue its formal mission [e.g. and not politics] rather than constituent or personal interests”). 
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III.   STRUCTURE OF THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING  
 STANDARDS BOARD 
Given the history of accounting standards, it is not surprising that at 
least one scholar has noted that FASB should be a model for other 
industries in terms of using private standards as public regulations.66 
Whether the FASB model is appropriate or wise to follow is a question 
largely unanswered. Therefore, this Comment seeks to draw on the history 
of accounting regulation in order to shed light on best practices for 
pursuing environmental standard-setting should the trend of private 
standards continue. 
The FASB is structured under the Financial Accounting Foundation 
(FAF), a not-for-profit board originally made up of nine members which 
describes itself as “the independent, private-sector organization with 
responsibility for, [amongst other things,] [e]stablishing and improving 
financial accounting and reporting standards.”67 FAF was created in 1972, 
but in 1973 delegated authority to promulgate accounting standards to 
FASB. “The [original] premise” of the structure of FAF and FASB “was 
to promote independence in the hopes that this would ground decisions in 
objective data.”68 Though the federal government was central to its 
recognition, independence from Congress also remained an important 
focus.69 Since its creation, FAF has remained responsible for appointing 
seven full-time members to FASB,70 while the SEC, Congress, and the 
President have no role in appointing FASB members.71 In contrast to the 
volunteer and part-time members of the CAP and APB, FASB members 
are paid and “are required to sever connections with the firms or 
institutions they served before joining the Board.”72 The Board members 
serve up to two five-year terms.73 Today, the seven-member board 
                                                   
66. Bratton, supra note 29, at 6 (“It commends a more relaxed approach, both reminding us that 
private actors, properly incented and deployed, can regulate successfully, and asking us to think of 
governance as a cooperative undertaking among public and private actors jointly confronting 
problems needing solutions.”). 
67. Financial Accounting Foundation, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, 
https://www.fasb.org/faf/faf_info.shtml [https://perma.cc/DD8W-VTDV]. Note that today’s FAF 
includes fourteen to eighteen trustees responsible for direction, oversight, and the appointment of 
members to, amongst its other bodies, the FASB. 
See  FAF  Trustees  and  Committees,  FIN.  ACCT.  FOUND.,  https://www.accountingfoundation.org
/trustees [https://perma.cc/8PR2-ZCX7]. 
68. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 500. 
69. Id. at 501. 
70. About the FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.fasb.org/facts/ [https://perma.cc/4Q7D-
7VTR] [hereinafter About the FASB]. 
71. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 500. 
72. About the FASB, supra note 70.  
73. Id. 
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contains two former public accounting professionals, one academic, two 
“financial statement user[s],” and one “public company preparer.”74 
As alluded to above, U.S. GAAP is the set of accounting principles to 
which U.S. public company financial statements must conform.75 In order 
to be listed on a securities exchange in the United States, a company must 
present its periodic financial statements in U.S. GAAP76—in other words, 
GAAP is a common financial language.77 To understand its reach and 
impact, consider that as of 2005, U.S. GAAP “consist[ed] of over 2,000 
individual accounting and reporting pronouncements.”78 Companies must 
conform their financial statements to each of these, covering a broad range 
of topics from how to record revenues,79 to how to account for leases,80 to how 
to record service contracts for intangible assets such as assets used for 
cloud  computing.81 
To illustrate the breadth and impact of GAAP, consider that GAAP dictates 
the manner in which companies must depreciate their physical assets (such as 
buildings, equipment, property, etc.) for presentation on their balance sheets 
(the value of the asset) and income statements (the “expense” each period for 
depreciation).82 Commonly, GAAP requires straight-line depreciation.83 That 
means, every company to which GAAP applies must calculate a monthly 
depreciation expense for each of its assets as follows: (Purchase cost of the 
                                                   
74. Id.  
75. Israel Klein, The Gap in the Perception of GAAP, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 581, 595 (2017); Pearson, 
supra note 10, at 84. 
76. Pearson, supra note 10, at 84. 
77. Klein, supra note 75, at 582 (noting one “legal perception that sees GAAP as a ‘dictionary’”). 
78. Pearson, supra note10, at 85. 
79. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2017-14, INCOME 
STATEMENT—REPORTING COMPREHENSIVE INCOME (TOPIC 220), REVENUE RECOGNITION (TOPIC 
605), AND REVENUE FROM CONTRACTS WITH CUSTOMERS (TOPIC 606) (2017), 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176169471253&acceptedDiscla
imer=true [https://perma.cc/A39V-ZJ68].  
80. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2018-
10, CODIFICATION IMPROVEMENTS TO TOPIC 842, LEASES (2018), https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/
Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176170939898&acceptedDisclaimer=true 
[https://perma.cc/4C7Z-QYMK].  
81. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2018-15, 
INTANGIBLES—GOODWILL AND OTHER—INTERNAL-USE SOFTWARE (SUBTOPIC 350-40): 
CUSTOMER’S ACCOUNTING FOR IMPLEMENTATION COSTS INCURRED IN A CLOUD 
COMPUTING  ARRANGEMENT THAT IS A SERVICE CONTRACT (2018), https://www.fasb.org/jsp
/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1176171138858&acceptedDisclaimer=true 
[https://perma.cc/BB6V-PU43]. 
82. See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE NO. 2014-
08, PRESENTATION OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (TOPIC 205) AND PROPERTY, PLANT, AND 
EQUIPMENT (TOPIC 360) (2014); Howard B. Levy, Depreciable Asset Lives, CPA J. 
(Sept.  2016),  https://www.cpajournal.com/2016/09/08/depreciable-asset-lives/ 
[https://perma.cc/QK5R-FWUW].  
83. Levy, supra note 82.  
 
McGill Final.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/28/20  11:18 PM 
2020] ACCOUNTING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 71 
 
asset–any expected salvage value) / expected useful life of the asset.84 For 
example, assume public company A purchases a laptop for its newest employee 
for $1000. It expects the laptop to be useful for five years, and worth $100 in 
salvage value after five years of use. GAAP would require the company to 
record monthly for five years an expense of $15 (($1000 - $100) / (5 years x 12 
months), and to decrease the laptop’s “book value” by a corresponding $15 
each month so that at the end of five years, the laptop’s book value is $100. 
While physical depreciation is (most of the time) one of GAAP’s most 
straightforward standards, keep in mind that GAAP requires depreciation to be 
recorded in this manner for every asset, and similarly dictates recording 
standards for nearly any other type of activity carried out by a company. 
Hopefully, this short and simple example shows the broad latitude of U.S. 
GAAP for American companies. 
A. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Leads to the SEC’s Acceptance of FASB 
Today, more than fifty years since its initial recognition by the SEC, 
the “FASB is the standard-setter for U.S. GAAP; unless and until the SEC 
says otherwise, U.S. public companies must report financial information 
prepared using U.S. GAAP.”85 In 2002, the SEC passed the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)—another landmark act for public companies 
and financial regulation.86 The Act came in response to multibillion dollar 
accounting scandals by Enron and WorldCom, and in the simplest terms, 
“required public companies to make sure their internal controls against 
fraud were not full of holes.”87 Despite its broad sweeping regulatory 
changes, the law was passed, nearly unanimously by the House and 
Senate, and signed by President George W. Bush.88 For auditors of public 
companies, SOX meant not only would auditors continue to opine on their 
clients’ financial statements, but would now also issue an opinion on their 
clients’ internal controls over financial reporting though could play no 
role in enacting or enforcing such internal controls.89 
                                                   
84. Id.  
85. Stein et al., supra note 61, at 3; see also Ward, supra note 58, at 214 (“The determination and 
definition of generally accepted accounting principles rest with the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB), which is an independent private sector body.”).  
86. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204 (2002). 
87. Floyd Norris, Goodbye to Reforms of 2002, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/business/06norris.html [https://perma.cc/NSL6-99N5]. 
88. Id.  
89. Daniel L. Goelzer, Sarbanes-Oxley and the Post-Enron Environment: Auditor Oversight, 
Address at Columbia University Law Center, CTR. JAPANESE LEGAL STUD. 
(Aug.  2,  2005), https://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/08022005_GoelzerSOXAuditorOversight.
aspx [https://perma.cc/62QT-E4RV]. SOX section 203 also added an audit partner rotation 
requirement for public companies to achieve “a fresh look to the independence of the audit function.” 
SEC Strengthening the Commission’s Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, 17 C.F.R. pts. 
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Additionally, SOX established formal oversight over the accounting 
profession via the PCAOB—the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board.90 Similar to the SEC’s authority to recognize accounting standards 
in the 1930s, the creation of the PCAOB put the government in a more 
authoritative role within the accounting industry.91 SOX also required a 
“private entity” be recognized as the accounting standards setting body,92 
and required the board of said entity to be funded under the Act—which 
meant it would be funded by the public companies themselves.93 
Interestingly, at the time, FASB was “the only standard-setting body 
that . . . fulfill[ed] [the] requirements” of the law.94 
In 2003, the FASB was again adopted by the SEC as the private 
accounting standards entity––an entity the SEC was required to name by 
                                                   
210, 240, 249, 274 (2003). Under the rule, “the lead and concurring partners [are required] to rotate 
after five years and, upon rotation, [are] subject to a five-year ‘time out’ period.” Id. This rotation 
requirement appears to be a commitment of at least the Big Four public accounting firms. See, e.g., 
KPMG, ENHANCING AUDIT QUALITY AND TRANSPARENCY  9 (2017), 
https://home.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/us/pdf/2018/01/734095-enhancing-audit-quality-v6web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UQA8-KMV2] (discussing the SEC’s requirements and “its Partner Rotation 
System, which assists in monitoring assignments of certain personnel and initiating personnel changes 
on entities” it audits).  
90. Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its 
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975, 1007 (2005). 
91. Id. 
92. Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 108 (2002). The statutory requirements for the SEC to follow in 
recognizing an accounting standard setting body under SOX are that it:  
(i) [I]s organized as a private entity; 
(ii) has, for administrative and operational purposes, a board of trustees (or equivalent body) 
serving in the public interest, the majority of whom are not, concurrent with their service on such 
board, and have not been during the 2-year period preceding such service, associated persons of 
any registered public accounting firm; 
(iii) is funded as provided in section 109 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; 
(iv) has adopted procedures to ensure prompt consideration, by majority vote of its members, of 
changes to accounting principles necessary to reflect emerging accounting issues and changing 
business practices; and 
(v) considers, in adopting accounting principles, the need to keep standards current in order to 
reflect changes in the business environment, the extent to which international convergence on 
high quality accounting standards is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the 
protection of investors; and 
(B) that the Commission determines has the capacity to assist the Commission in fulfilling the 
requirements of subsection (a) and section 13(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
because, at a minimum, the standard setting body is capable of improving the accuracy and 
effectiveness of financial reporting and the protection of investors under the securities laws.  
93. 15 U.S.C. § 77s(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2012).  
94. Fleckner, supra note 50, at 286 (noting that when SOX was passed, and still today, “[t]he only 
standard-setting body that currently fulfills these requirements is the FASB”); see also id. at 295 
(noting a letter from the Chairman and President of the Financial Accounting Foundation to the 
Commissioner of the SEC commenting on $64,000 spent by FASB for lobbying to Congress). 
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SOX.95 FASB remains the sole entity today to fulfill SOX’s requirements, 
and remains the SEC’s recognized accounting standard setter for purposes 
of U.S. public companies.96 “U.S. public companies must report financial 
information prepared using U.S. GAAP, as set by FASB.”97 As it turns 
out, the 2003 policy statement recognizing FASB effectively means 
“FASB standards are authoritatively considered to be U.S. GAAP without 
the SEC taking any affirmative action.”98 The SEC has read broadly its 
authority to adopt a private entity’s standards, and does so “wholesale, not 
on a standard-by-standard basis after analyzing each FASB 
pronouncement on its merits.”99 What’s resulted is a “highly deferential 
attitude” of the SEC with respect to FASB.100 
To highlight the SEC’s “wholesale adoption” of FASB standards as 
authoritative, one scholar has made the observation that in contrast to the 
European Union’s accounting standard-setter—which find no authority 
for their standards “unless the European Commission expressly adopts 
them”—FASB standards “are given authority unless the Securities and 
Exchange Commission intervenes.”101 This contrast, in addition to many 
other points which will be raised later in this Comment, is one reason why, 
despite FASB’s claim to be a “private entity,” FASB is subject to 
constitutional and administrative law limits.102 
                                                   
95. Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard 
Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47743, 70 Fed. Reg. (Apr. 
25, 2003); see also Bratton, supra note 29, at 24 (arguing that with the recognition of FASB’s as the 
SEC’s chosen private entity and with FASB’s public funding, it became more fit for government as 
the SEC is doing the funding, not private parties).  
96. See Fleckner, supra note 50, at 286.  
97. Stein et al., supra note 61, at 3; see SEC Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.4-01(a)(1) (2019) 
(Rule 4-01(a)(1) requiring financial statements filed with the SEC to follow generally accepted 
accounting principles, i.e. GAAP, or otherwise “presumed to be misleading or inaccurate.”). 
98. Stein et al., supra note 61, at 3 (emphasis omitted).  
99. Id. at 4. 
100. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 514. The SEC’s “What We Do” page of its website states that its 
Office of the Chief Accountant “works closely with the Financial Accounting Standards Board, whose 
accounting standards the Commission has recognized as generally accepted for purposes of the federal 
securities laws” as one of its main roles. What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
supra note 11. 
101. Fleckner, supra note 50, at 291 (the author goes on the argue that the U.S. approach is better 
insulated from unnecessary political pressures:  “it is much easier to lobby the European Commission 
to not adopt a standard than to lobby the Securities and Exchange Commission to reject  a standard”).  
102. See supra note 42 (demonstrating the courts’ treatment of private governmental entities with 
an example concerning Amtrak).  
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IV.  CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF FASB 
AND GAAP 
Despite its recognition by the SEC and the role of its standards, 
minimal constitutional claims have been mounted against FASB, its 
structure, and its function as a quasi-governmental agency. To date, there 
has only been one “challenge to FASB on the basis that it is subject to 
federal agency requirements.”103 Additionally, “[w]hether the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and other administrative law tools 
apply to FASB has received only minimal treatment in legal 
scholarship.”104 Because the unconstitutionality of FASB depends on the 
existence of a harm “sufficiently imminent”105 the minimal legal 
challenges and scholarship to FASB could mean that such harm has yet to 
exist (or to last long enough to warrant a judicial challenge).106 However, 
certain legal doctrines, as will be explored in this section, are worth 
considering with regard to FASB to foreshadow potential legal challenges 
for private environmental standard-setters. 
A. FASB’s Structure Raises Appointment and Removal Concerns 
One potential constitutional issue with FASB—and often with other 
entities of its kind—arises under the Appointments Clause of the 
Constitution. This clause gives the President the power to appoint 
“Officers of the United States” and Congress the power to appoint 
“inferior Officers.”107 FASB’s seven-member board, as mentioned, is 
appointed solely by the FAF—an entity whose own board is not appointed 
by the SEC, President, or any government official. FASB members may 
be considered “officers” of the United States for Appointments Clause 
purposes if (1) the scope of their powers gives them legal authority of the 
federal government, and (2) their role can be fairly considered 
“continuing” employment.108 
In regard to the second prong, the FASB board members almost surely 
enjoy employment that is continuing because their five-year term is more 
                                                   
103. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 497.  
104. Id. at 496.  
105. Stein et al., supra note 61, at 6. 
106. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 7, at 506 (pointing to challenges in bringing suit against FASB). 
107. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate, shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law 
vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the 
Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”).  
108. Lucia v. S.E.C., __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018).  
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than “temporary” or “episodic.”109 Whether FASB members’ powers give 
them “legal authority” in the government, however, is a debatable 
question.110 To illustrate, in Lucia v. S.E.C.,111 the Supreme Court 
considered SEC administrative law judges’ (ALJs’) abilities to take 
testimony, conduct trial, enforce compliance orders, and make binding and 
final decisions as indicative of the power to exercise legal authority.112 The 
Court held the administrative hearing led by the SEC ALJ for Mr. Lucia 
was unconstitutional because the ALJ had not been appointed in a manner 
dictated by the Appointments Clause.113 It is uncertain what functions of 
FASB would matter should a court be faced with deciding whether its entire 
board is subject to the language of the Appointments Clause, but at least its 
seven-member board may be considered. 
A related consideration to the President’s appointment power is their 
removal power, which concerns the President’s ability to fire members of 
the Executive Branch at will or for cause.114 This power is not expressly 
mentioned in the Constitution, but is inferred from the Vesting and Take 
Care Clauses.115 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. 
Olson,116 any limit on the President’s ability to remove “Officers” in the 
Executive Branch must not trample on his ability to “faithfully execute[]” 
the laws.117 In practice, this means many officers of the U.S. are not directly 
removable by the President, but are, properly, directly removable by other 
high-level governmental actors,118 and therefore indirectly removable by 
the President through the threats of removal. 
                                                   
109. Id. at 2052 (2018).   
110. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 7, at 522–23 (noting “potential challengers could take a cue from 
Free Enterprise Fund and challenge the appointment and removal of FASB members,” and 
continuing to assert that “[i]f FASB is a federal agency subject to administrative law doctrines, its 
current member selection and removal process is unconstitutional”).  
111. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018). 
112. Id. at 2053. 
113. Id. at 2049–56 (their appointment was not within the Appointments Clause’s criteria because 
the SEC’s ALJs were selected by “other staff members” of the SEC, as opposed to the SEC’s 
Commissioner, for example, or another officer).  
114. See Martin, supra note 20, at 293–94.  
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3; see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–90 (1988) (“The 
analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those officials 
who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere 
with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.”).  
116. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
117. Id. at 689–93. 
118. Id.  
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In Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,119 the Supreme Court considered 
the removal structure of the PCAOB—a related entity to FASB.120 
Therein, it held the PCAOB’s “double for-cause” structure of removal 
violated the constitutional removal principles.121 Whereas PCAOB 
members were removable “for cause” by members of the SEC (who 
themselves were also removable by the President “for cause”), none of the 
seven members of FASB’s Board are even directly removable by the SEC 
or the President.122 Scholars have said that the lack of the ability for the 
President to directly appoint, control, or remove any member of FASB—
despite their ability to set authoritative GAAP for U.S. public companies, 
a form of both legal and “continuing” authority—raises appointment 
and  removal concerns.123 
B. FASB’s Structure Raises Questions of the Non-Delegation Doctrine 
A second potential constitutional issue with FASB comes from 
Congress’s all but explicit recognition of it as the authoritative standard-
setting body for U.S. public companies.124 The nondelegation doctrine is 
a product of Article I of the Constitution, which states: “[a]ll legislative 
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States.”125 Though the Supreme Court recognizes that Congress may not 
pass its strictly legislative powers to another branch, it has also recognized 
that “the Constitution does not ‘deny[] to the Congress the necessary 
                                                   
119. 561 U.S. 477 (2010).  
120. Id. at 485.  
121. Id. at 495–508.  
122. About the FASB, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.fasb.org/facts/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Q7D-7VTR] (stating that the FAF Board of Trustees appoint Board members, who 
are eligible to serve up to ten years). 
123. See generally Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) 
(suggesting that FASB may present similar appointment and removal concerns as those held to exist with 
the closely-related agency, PCAOB); Stein et al., supra note 61, at 5 (“The FASB members are neither 
appointed nor removable by the President, yet the SEC treats FASB as wielding greater sovereign 
authority than the PCAOB, with FASB’s pronouncements having automatic legal effect.”). But see 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and Financial Regulation: The Case of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 485, 490–91 (2009) (understanding a broad and liberal 
reading of the Constitution to mean that, in understanding the PCAOB specifically, “[t]he Constitution 
permits Congress to create administrative agencies with diverse structures, including entities that 
function under the control and authority of these agencies. The separation of powers and the 
Appointments Clause limit Congress in only one particular way: Congress cannot retain any legal right 
to participate itself directly in the appointment or removal of officials who execute and implement federal 
law, nor can Congress retain any right to veto (or in any other way directly participate in) an agency’s 
policymaking or adjudication decision. Because Congress has granted itself none of these powers over 
the Board or the SEC, the Act is constitutional”). 
124. See Ochoa, supra note 7, at 516.  
125. U.S. CONST. art. I § 1. See also Gundy v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 
(2019).   
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resources of flexibility and practicality [that enable it] to perform its 
functions.’”126 
With this flexibility and practicality in mind, Congress has long been 
allowed to delegate to the executive branch (i.e. agencies), via statute, the 
ability to implement and enforce the laws, while it must retain its ability 
to make law.127 According to the Court, a statutory delegation from 
Congress to an administrative agency is constitutional so long as it 
includes an “intelligible principle” under which the agency can act.128 In 
practice, this principle means “a delegation is permissible if Congress has 
made clear to the delegee ‘the general policy’ he must pursue and the 
‘boundaries of [his] authority.’”129 In other words, so long as the statute–
–under which Congress transfers powers from itself to a part of the 
executive branch––includes a “general policy” by which the executive 
branch should implement and enforce the laws passed by Congress, the 
statute, and the transfer of power, pass constitutional muster. Since 1935, 
the Court has applied this standard, but has never shut down a statute for 
lack of an intelligible principle.130 In 2019, a plurality of the Court––albeit 
a very thin plurality because Justice Kavanaugh took no part in the 
decision––said it was “clear” that the standard is “not demanding.”131 
                                                   
126. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 (internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Grimaud, 
220 U.S. 506, 520 (1911) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1982)) (internal 
quotations omitted) (“The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law 
to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to 
make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many 
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking 
power, and must therefore be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the halls of 
legislation.”). 
127. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123.  
128. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (applying the 
“intelligible principle” doctrine and remanding to the court of appeals “for reinterpretation that would 
avoid a supposed delegation of legislative power”); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) 
(finding Congress wrongly delegated legislative power because there was “no policy,” “no standard,” 
and “no rule . . . of circumstances and conditions in which the transportation” regulations were to be 
applied).   
129. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., 
329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)). The uncertainty of the future of the Court’s position on the non-delegation 
doctrine should not be understated. See, e.g., Jeannie S. Gersen, The Supreme Court is Now One Vote 
Away from Changing How the U.S. is Governed, NEW YORKER (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-supreme-court-is-one-vote-away-from-
changing-how-the-us-is-governed [https://perma.cc/CTB4-YBAL] (commenting that because of the 
thin plurality, Justice Kavanaugh’s absence from any decision, and Justice Alito’s concurrence, “[w]e 
are now explicitly on notice that the Court will likely abandon its long-standing tolerance of Congress 
delegating broadly to agencies”). 
130. See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (2019) (“Only twice in this country’s history (and that in a 
single year) have we found a delegation excessive––in each case because ‘Congress had failed to 
articulate any policy or standard’ to confine discretion.” (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting))).  
131. Id. This belief was also emphasized by the dissent in Gundy, wherein Justice Gorsuch, with 
whom Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas joined, chose to revisit––and seemingly redefine––
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Commonly, the non-delegation doctrine is studied and used in the 
context of Congress’s delegation to clearly public agencies. However, the 
nondelegation doctrine similarly applies in the context of Congress’s 
delegation to private entities with governmental authority.132 In fact, some 
scholars suggest these types of delegations “raise issues that are even 
more troubling than those stemming from congressional delegations to 
administrative agencies.”133 Delegation by Congress to private entities has 
been challenged under the nondelegation doctrine before, but not in the 
context of FASB.134 Although the SEC recognizes FASB as a “private 
entity” for purposes of accounting standards, that label is not necessarily 
controlling, or indicative of any outcome under a test of the nondelegation 
doctrine.135 And in any case, the statute that controls the authority for 
FASB to issue accounting standards gives the SEC at least some 
guidelines for how to choose such an entity.136 
The United States Supreme Court has applied the doctrine in distinct 
forms to both public and private entities.137 However, the lack of muster 
to the doctrine since 1935 means challenges under it—even challenges to 
                                                   
the Court’s long-standing precedent on the nondelegation doctrine. In discussing the development of 
the doctrine, he plainly stated, “[t]his mutated version of the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no 
basis in the original meaning of the Constitution.” Id. at 2139. Justice Alito, though concurring with 
the plurality, wrote that if a majority of the Court were willing to reconsider its “extraordinarily 
capacious standards,” he would “support that effort.” Id. at 2131. Whether a future Court––or future 
case––may spur a majority of the Court to revisit its standards under the nondelegation doctrine is a 
question outside the scope of this Comment.  
132. See, e.g., Stein et al., supra note 61, at 3 (noting in the case of FASB, “[t]here is a strong 
argument that the SEC’s policy of prospectively granting blanket recognition to future FASB 
accounting rule changes violates Article I of the Constitution and the private non-delegation doctrine 
by impermissibly delegating rulemaking authority to a private, unaccountable body without sufficient 
oversight by either the SEC or Congress”).  
133. Nagy, supra note 90, at 1058–59 (noting that “even nebulous phrases such as ‘in the public 
interest’ and ‘just and reasonable’ qualify as standards that are ‘intelligible,’” and cautioning that 
“court decisions, including by the Supreme Court, demonstrate that governmental oversight of private 
decisionmaking will generally insulate Congress’s private delegations from 
constitutional  challenge’”). 
134. See United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975); Noblecraft Indus., 
Inc. v. Sec’y of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980) (OSHA adopts some private standards); Todd & 
Co, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977); R.H. Johnson & Co. v. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1952).   
135. Nagy, supra note 90, at 1040.  
136. See supra note 92. 
137. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) (holding that the authority to 
regulate hours and wages of coal industry works conferred from Congress to a majority of coal 
producer’s and miners was “legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even 
delegation to an official or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose 
interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business”); see also Nagy, 
supra note 90, at 1058–59 (highlighting differences in the application of the nondelegation doctrine 
to private and public entities).  
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Congress’s delegation of power to private agencies—are, for lack of a 
better word, challenging.138 
One scholar has noted the dangers of delegations to private entities—
even those that do pass the test of an “intelligible principle.”139 In her 
analysis of the PCAOB, the sister entity to the FASB and similarly born 
out of SOX, she writes, 
The greater risks posed by Congress ceding public power to 
private entities have prompted some scholars to speculate that 
federal courts may be less reluctant to invalidate private 
delegations, particularly if the congressional delegation involved 
“core” governmental powers. But court decisions, including by 
the Supreme Court, demonstrate that governmental oversight of 
private decisionmaking will generally insulate Congress’s private 
delegations from constitutional challenge.140 
Congress did not create an intelligible principle for FASB to follow, and 
arguably, neither has the SEC.141 Instead, with SOX, Congress delegated 
to the SEC to adopt a private entity to be the authoritative standard-setter 
for public company financial reporting.142 
In the minds of some, FASB created its own sort of “intelligible 
principles” in its adoption of its Conceptual Framework.143 Since adopting 
the Conceptual Framework in 1978, FASB has amended the Framework’s 
“Concepts Statements” a handful of times.144 Per its website, the purpose 
of the Framework’s “Concepts” is, 
to serve the public interest by setting the objectives, qualitative 
characteristics, and other concepts that guide selection of 
economic phenomena to be recognized and measured for 
                                                   
138. Nagy, supra note 90, at 1058 (noting that in the Court’s recent history, “even nebulous phrases 
such as ‘in the public interest’ and ‘just and reasonable’ qualify as standards that are ‘intelligible’” 
under the doctrine).  
139. Id. at 1057.  
140. Id. at 1059.  
141. Bratton, supra note 29, at 15 ( “The constituents needed to come to a basic agreement, if not 
on the terms of particular standards, then at a more general level on the substantive mission of the 
enterprise. The founders left this constitutional task to the agency itself.”).  
142. Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 108 (2002) (directing for the adoption of a private entity); see 
supra  note 65.  
143. The Conceptual Framework, FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/BridgePage&cid=1176168367774 [https://perma.cc/L5T9-
B3YM]; see also Bratton, supra note 29, at 29–30 (suggesting that the Framework is the way by 
which FASB can “proceed above politics” because “it made a political decision” of its own via the 
Framework); Ochoa, supra note 7, at 509 (“FASB, on its own, created the Conceptual Framework as 
to mirror the intelligible principle required by the nondelegation doctrine.”). 
144. Concept  Statements,  FIN.  ACCT.  STANDARDS  BOARD, 
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/PreCodSectionPage&cid=1176156317989 
[https://perma.cc/77QP-CM6S].  
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financial reporting and their display in financial statements or 
related means of communicating information to those who are 
interested. . . . [And to] guide the Board in developing sound 
accounting principles and provide the Board and its constituents 
with an understanding of the appropriate content and inherent 
limitations of financial reporting.145 
If the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine, as many say, is to ensure 
public agencies have a guiding principle by which to adopt policy, the 
FASB’s Framework may be a step in the right direction. It proclaims to 
be a “guide” to FASB and “to serve the public interest” in providing a 
measuring stick by which the public can judge FASB’s work. The issue 
in terms of the non-delegation doctrine, however, seems to be that FASB’s 
Framework is entirely self-created; “intelligible principle[s]” under 
constitutional principles are created by Congress and created by statute, 
suggesting under this doctrine, FASB is ripe for challenge.146 The issue, 
it seems, may be finding the proper plaintiff to challenge the SEC’s 
“delegation” to FASB.147 
C. FASB May be Subject to the APA 
Beyond the question of the constitutionality of Congress’s delegation of 
governmental status—or at least recognition—to a private entity comes the 
question of what governmental limits and restraints apply to private entities 
with public authority. One of the biggest, if not the biggest, influences on 
federal agency action is the Administrative Procedure Act. Amongst other 
matters, the APA impacts an agency’s rulemaking abilities, disciplinary 
proceedings, and the way by which the agency interacts with the public and 
other functions of the Executive branch.148 
Whether the Administrative Procedure Act and other administrative 
law tools apply to FASB has received only minimal treatment in legal 
scholarship, and as referenced above, virtually no direct treatment by the 
courts.149 That the APA may apply to FASB, however, is not an 
unthinkable premise. In Lebron,150 the Court addressed whether the APA 
could apply to non-governmental entities, (such as the government-
                                                   
145. Id. 
146. See generally Stein et al., supra note 61. 
147. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 506. The hurdles for plaintiffs to bring suit challenging the FASB is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
148. GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 303–09 (West Acad. Pub., 7th ed., 2016).  
149. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 496. 
150. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).  
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created corporations discussed in Part I), and held it could.151 However, it 
found the application of the APA to a non-governmental entity was a 
matter “within Congress’s control,” because it was a matter that 
“impose[d] obligations or confer[red] powers upon Government 
entities.”152 However, this holding diverged from its holding on whether 
Congress could determine whether constitutional limits would apply to 
nongovernmental agencies.153 
In contemplating the applicability of the APA to the PCAOB, scholars 
have suggested that Congress’s recognition of the nongovernmental 
board, via the SEC, could be enough to warrant applicability of the 
APA.154 Whether the formal application of the APA to FASB would be 
enough to bring about legal challenges, or any sort of substantial changes, 
however, remains questionable.155 Because FASB does not yet clearly fall 
under the APA, judicial review may differ when a court is faced with 
challenges to FASB (for better or for worse).156 
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE PUBLIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD-SETTING 
As noted, since the early 1900s, the federal government has recognized 
the benefits of outsourcing elements of its regulatory, rulemaking, and 
standard-setting roles to private players.157 Its reasons for doing so 
generally come from a place of good faith, and in some cases, an honest 
recognition that in the particular arena, the government “really does have 
limited resources and attention span.”158 Aside from any good intentions 
                                                   
151. Id. at 393.  
152. Id. at 392.  
153. Id. at 391–93 (holding that, although Amtrak’s organic statute expressed it would “not be an 
agency” or establishment of the government, it was not within the power for “Congress to make the 
final determination of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the 
constitutional rights of citizens affected by its action. . . . The Constitution constrains governmental 
action . . . under whatever congressional label”). The Court held that “Government-created and -
controlled corporations are (for many purposes at least) part of the Government itself” not merely 
because of “past practice and understanding,” but because of “reason itself.” Id. at 397. And going on 
to say, “[i]t surely cannot be that government, state or federal, is able to evade the most solemn 
obligations imposed in the Constitution by simply resorting to the corporate form.” Id. 
154. Nagy, supra note 90, at 1062–65. 
155. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 7, at 511–14 (analyzing, under a variety of approaches, whether 
FASB could be a governmental entity).  
156. The scope of judicial review over administrative agencies is outside the scope of this 
comment. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 7, at 510 (“FASB has enjoyed the respect and deference due 
to an expert agency, but to date it has not been subject to the oversight requirements that attempt to 
ensure accountability for agency decision making.”).  
157. See supra, Part I; Maurer, supra note 15, at 302 (“American industry has practiced self-
governance since the Nineteenth Century.”).  
158. Maurer, supra note 15, at 336. 
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in outsourcing, there are identifiable benefits of recognizing private 
entities as authoritative. These should not be ignored. In the case of FASB, 
for example, the SEC’s recognition of its standards as U.S. GAAP 
promotes reliability and consistency across U.S. public company financial 
reporting.159 Reliable and consistent financial statements, in turn, support 
the SEC’s overall mission of protecting investors and ensuring fairness in 
financial markets. 
However, the accompanying costs and consequences, including legal 
ones, overwhelm the prospect of outsourcing governmental authority in 
some scenarios. This Comment argues that environmental regulations 
may present one of those scenarios. Drawing upon the costs and 
consequences of the SEC’s wholesale adoption of FASB as the 
authoritative accounting standards setter in the U.S., the federal 
government should be cautious before wholesale adopting any current 
private environmental standards. 
A. There are Reasons for Public Recognition of Private Regulations 
As stated, there are both costs and benefits of the government’s 
recognition of private standard-setting bodies as authoritative. The 
benefits of the public recognition of private regulations include better 
input from experts,160 potential cost cutting,161 and uniform standards 
across an industry.162 In the case of FASB, for example, the SEC was able 
to draw upon the experience, knowledge, and expertise of a well-
established and widely-recognized private body by simply issuing a 
policy statement recognizing FASB as the authoritative private entity 
under SOX.163 In other words, it did not have to recruit, establish, or adopt 
any of the experience, knowledge, and expertise itself, nor did it have to 
appoint the body’s members or source its funding. 
Additionally, it had been recommended to the SEC that the accounting 
standard-setter remain private to “draw on private sector expertise and 
                                                   
159. Andrew F. Kirkendall, Filling in the GAAP: Will the Sarbanes-Oxley Act Protect Investors 
from Corporate Malfeasance and Restore Confidence in the Securities Market, 56 SMU L. REV. 2303, 
2307 (2003) (“To ensure comparability, reliability, and materiality of the financial 
statements of a company, the statements must be prepared in accordance with GAAP.”).  
160. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 15, at 315 (referencing the better input of experts in the context 
of municipal adoption of LEED standards).  
161. See, e.g., id. at 328 (discussing how “[p]rivate organizations have an incentive to” achieve 
lower costs).  
162. Id. at 289 (the widespread adoption of LEED standards is creating “a uniform, nationally 
promulgated private regulatory scheme,” but the author highlights many problems).  
163. Policy Statement: Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated Private-Sector Standard 
Setter, Securities Act Release No. 33-8221, Exchange Act Release No. 34-47743, 70 Fed. Reg. (Apr. 
25, 2003). 
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avoid susceptibility to political pressure.”164 And to FASB’s benefit, the 
SEC’s recognition of its standard-setting authority gave it increased fiscal 
independence from its supporters.165 Finally, it almost goes without saying 
that without the recognition of FASB, the SEC would be without its uniform 
standards, and arguably without a feasible way to create U.S. GAAP—the 
uniform standard for U.S. public companies.166 
B. There are Significant Issues with Private Regulations Being 
Wholesale Adopted by the Federal Government 
The benefits of the SEC’s adoption of a private entity to be the authority 
for U.S. GAAP are not without consequence. Though few legal challenges 
have been posed against FASB, the potential for said challenges is, if 
nothing else, mounting.167 As the need for, and the breadth of, U.S. GAAP 
increases, so too do the potential conflicts with the FASB’s current structure 
within the broader federal government. First, FASB’s structure raises 
appointment and removal concerns within broader separation of powers 
doctrines. As scholars have noted, that FASB members are not appointed 
by the SEC, the President, or any government official raises concern that 
the President’s ability to control any member of FASB is more attenuated 
than the Constitution allows for.168 It was a structure similar to this that 
caused the Supreme Court to reject the PCAOB’s appointment and removal 
structure in Free Enterprise.169 
Second, FASB’s position within the SEC’s broad regulatory scheme 
raises concern that despite its claim to be a “private entity,” FASB enjoys 
much deference and all-but-automatic legal recognition when it comes to 
its standards.170 As one scholar has noted: “private standard setters bear 
no responsibility to the public and, therefore, are free to advocate for the 
commercial interests of their members and their clients, all at a great 
                                                   
164. Bratton, supra note 29, at 13. 
165. See, e.g., Bratton, supra note 29, at 24 (“Upon the SEC’s approval of the application, the 
FASB became publicly funded and ceased collecting contributions. Technically speaking, it is no 
longer beholden to its constituents.”). 
166. Stein et al., supra note 61, at 3. 
167. The strategies for mounting successful litigation against FASB, as well as reasons for why 
challenges have been limited at this point are outside the scope of this Comment. See generally, Stein 
et al., supra note 61.  
168. See, e.g., Stein et al., supra note 61, at 5, (“The FASB members are neither appointed nor 
removable by the President, yet the SEC treats . . . FASB’s pronouncements [as] having automatic 
legal effect.”).  
169. See supra notes 120–123. See also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 
561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
170. Fleckner, supra note 50, at 291 (noting that FASB’s standards are given automatic and legal 
effect unless the SEC decides otherwise).  
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public expense.”171 While this may allow some beneficial insulation from 
normal political lobbying,172 it veers awfully close to violating the 
“intelligible principle” standard of the nondelegation doctrine.173 This 
means that individuals and other private entities wanting to challenge 
FASB or certain standards within U.S. GAAP face not only high burdens 
in federal court,174 but uncertainty about whether the standard political 
process can address their concerns. Instead of this uncertainty, there 
should be adoption by elected or appointed officials—through what one 
scholar has called a “legitimate process.”175 
Finally, despite FASB’s attempts to craft Rules of Procedure in line 
with APA requirements, its creation of standards “inherently involves 
very different elements than does the creation of a law or statute to be 
imposed upon that industry by the government.”176 FASB’s “Rules of 
Procedure” require public “notice and comment” when FASB 
promulgates a new standard and make FASB’s meetings “open” to the 
public—both common features to the APA’s requirements.177 However, 
scholars have noted that FASB “has essentially been allowed to . . . cherry 
pick from agency requirements in its operations” and, in turn, “it has not 
been subject to the oversight requirements that attempt to ensure 
accountability for agency decision making.”178 The APA—one tool to 
ensure accountability—prescribes a public and open process by which 
individuals can observe, play roles in, and voice opinions about the 
creation of regulations.179 Despite FASB’s attempt to model the APA’s 
                                                   
171. Acevedo, supra note 18, at 65. 
172. Id.  
173. Nagy, supra note 90, at 1058.  
174. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 506. 
175. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 15, at 291–92 (defining “legitimate process” as a 
“regime . . . [to] ensure that the regulations implemented by local governments are subject to a 
promulgation and enforcement process that contains elements of transparency, democracy, and 
openness to public participation or that provides notice and an opportunity for voice and exit” and 
noting that such a process “better address[es] process concerns, including democracy, transparency, 
notice, voice, and exit”).  
176. Id. at 289–90, 325 (“[C]aution[ing] against local requirements that force private developers to 
comply with nationally promulgated, private, voluntary LEED standards as opposed to publicly 
created ones.”). 
177. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 509. 
178. Id. at 510.  
179. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 9 (1973) (noting two of the four purpose of the Administrative 
Procedure Act include (1) “To require agencies to keep the public currently informed of their 
organization, procedures and rules,” and (2) “To provide for public participation in the rule making 
process”). For excellent discussion of the need for a democratically public process in promulgating 
regulation, see Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to the Law: The Perplexing Federal 
Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737, 747 (2014) (“[R]egulatory beneficiaries 
need notice, since they are affected by and may make choices based on the content of the standards. 
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public and open process, without the formal and required applicability of 
that process, an element of accountability for the quasi-private entity is—
or at least has the potential to be—lost.180 
C. The Same Issues Will Exist if the Federal Government Adopts 
Private Environmental Standards 
The observable consequences of the SEC’s wholesale adoption of (1) a 
private entity as authoritative and (2) its standards as legally binding shed 
light into potential consequences should private environmental standards 
be adopted in a similar manner. In some instances, governmental adoption 
of private standards and enforcement is already well-established.181 For 
example, the early adopters of the private regulatory scheme, LEED 
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) green building 
standards have been overwhelmingly municipalities.182 In another 
recently studied example—Congress’s adoption of portions of the Food 
Safety Act in response to concerns about lettuce safety—one scholar 
noted some primary reasons why an industry may support federal action 
of that kind.183 These included goals to (1) “restore consumer confidence,” 
(2) “preempt the ongoing development of potentially 
stricter . . . standards,” and (3) “extend the same requirements . . . to level 
the playing field.”184 
Despite these encouraging goals, some scholars who have studied the 
municipal and broader government adoption of these, and other, private 
standards have noted that the resulting ordinances “are fraught with 
practical and legal problems.”185 For example, private standards do not 
always allow for full, public participation in creating and implementing 
standards, and remain voluntary for companies, individuals, and 
                                                   
And law needs to be widely, publicly accessible so that the public can invoke important mechanisms 
of accountability, including voting, contacting Congress, participating in agency procedures, and 
seeking judicial review.”).  
180. Ochoa, supra note 7, at 510 (“FASB has enjoyed the respect and deference due to an expert 
agency, but to date it has not been subject to the oversight requirements that attempt to ensure 
accountability for agency decision making.”). 
181. But see Madhusoodanan, supra note 5 (discussing examples of government adoption of 
private standards including Bolivia’s recent adoption of Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) standards 
when reforming its forestry code).  
182. Schindler, supra note 15, at 289, 312 (“Cities have begun to incorporate or refer to the LEED 
standards in their municipal codes.”).  
183. Margo J. Pollans, Regulating Farming: Balancing Food Safety and Environmental Protection 
in a Cooperative Governance Regime, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 399, 417 (2015). 
184. Id. at 417.  
185. Schindler, supra note 15, at 290 (“[C]aution[ing] against local requirements that force private 
developers to comply with nationally promulgated, private, voluntary LEED standards as opposed to 
publicly created ones.”).   
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organizations to follow, despite being widespread.186 These reflections 
indicate that even initially, adopting a national, one-size-fits-all model from 
an established private entity can address the difficulties of enforcing 
different regulations based on the state or locality, but doing so right off the 
bat can ignore “the diverse range of political, environmental, and 
socioeconomic conditions found at the state and local levels.”187 For 
example, one set of standards may not wholly address the needs of a 
jurisdiction with severe weather conditions or a jurisdiction whose 
economy is centered upon one industry.188 These diverse conditions are 
what formal processes like that of the APA seek to recognize. When a 
government—federal, state, or local—adopts a private entity’s standards 
and processes for establishing standards, the ability for individuals to 
challenge and add input to the process lessens significantly.189 
Besides these broader issues of private standard adoption, the same core 
issues with the SEC’s recognition of FASB will threaten any adoption of 
private environmental standard-setters by the federal government. First, 
adoption of private authorities will overlook the Constitution’s 
appointment and removal standards. Without effective Executive branch 
oversight on the otherwise-private standard-setters, the President’s, and 
their Executive branch’s, power is left too attenuated from the private 
standard-setter’s power. As commentators have noted in the accounting 
world, private standard-setters may be insulated from elected officials on 
whom the public can place their reliance. Second, the adoption of already-
created standards (which haven’t gone through a formal political process), 
assumes the private entity’s standards address all of the federal 
government’s, and public’s, concerns. Without a more “legitimate 
process”190 for adopting standards, the broad implications of 
environmental regulation and policy may be difficult to recognize––
especially when the social concerns and values underlying 
environmental  policy are so diverse. 
 
 
 
                                                   
186. Id. at 290.  
187. David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating 
Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1848–50 (2008) (arguing for an 
adaptive model of federalism where automatic federal preemption is unfavorable to the “unique 
virtues . . . [of] a dynamic system of overlapping federal-state jurisdiction has for environmental 
policymaking”). 
188. See, e.g., id. at 1848–49 (illustrating how varying economic, climate, and political values may 
be addressed by an adaptive federalism structure).  
189. Maurer, supra note 15, at 330 (“We argue that many private standards are designed to please 
a shadow electorate of consumers and employees.”).  
190. Schindler, supra note 15, at 291–92.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The federal government has outsourced functions for over one hundred 
years, and it has done so in a variety of fashions for a variety of topics. 
One such fashion of outsourcing is its adoption of existing private 
standards, which in turn gives public authority to otherwise private 
standard-setting entities. Within the regulation of accounting, the 
government has historically relied on private standard-setters to do the 
majority of its work since this kind of regulation became a federal priority. 
More recently, and arguably more notably, environmental regulations 
have become a priority, both publicly and privately. This Comment 
predicts the government may consider adopting environmental 
regulations in a manner similar to the regulation of accounting. Said 
differently, it may consider the wholesale adoption of existing private 
regulations to become public, legally binding regulations. If it considers 
doing so, this Comment raises the legal considerations in taking that route. 
The necessity for environmental regulations––which will reach as many, 
if not more, companies and persons as accounting regulations––demands 
a more legitimate governmental process to become legally binding. This 
Comment points to the democratic elements that may be missing should 
another path be taken. 
 
